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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Appeal is from the Court's Memorandum Decision and 
Declaratory Judgment granting Summary Judgment for the 
Plaintiffs, The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has 
jurisdiction to hear this Appeal under Utah Code Ann- §78-2-
2(3)(j) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)e(iii). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Board of State Lands upheld an audit and demand for 
payment issued by the Division of State Lands. The Plaintiffs 
filed a Declaratory Judgment action challenging the Board of 
State Land's decision. The trial court granted Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and entered a Judgment 
reversing the decision of the Board of State Lands. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented on this appeal are as follows: 
(1) Whether the trial court erred in entering Summary 
Judgment authorizing depletion of the trust asset for less than 
full value in view of Federal and State constitutional law 
governing school trust lands? 
(2) Whether the plain language of the lease may be 
rewritten by the court because one party claims it is ambiguous? 
(3) Whether Plaintiffs should be barred from using the 
doctrine of estoppel to avoid paying monies owed to the school 
trust fund when it was Plaintiffs' duty to report and pay the 
correct amount of royalties? 
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RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Enabling Act, §6: 
That upon the admission of said State into the Union, 
sections numbered two, sixteen, thirty-two, and thirty-
six in every township of said proposed state, and where 
such sections, or any parts thereof have been sold or 
otherwise disposed of by or under the authority of any 
Act of Congress, other lands equivalent thereto, in 
legal subdivisions of not less than one quarter section 
and as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of 
which the same is taken, are hereby granted to said 
State for the support of common schools.... 
Utah Enabling Act §10: 
That the proceeds of lands herein granted for 
educational purposes, except as hereinafter otherwise 
provided, shall constitute a permanent school fund, the 
interest of which only shall be expended for the 
support of said schools, and such land shall not be 
subject to pre-emption, homestead entry, or any other 
entry under the land laws of the United States, whether 
surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed for 
school purposes only. 
Utah Constitution, Article X, §5: 
The proceeds of the sale of lands reserved by an Act of 
Congress, approved February 21st, 1855, for the 
establishment of the University of Utah, and of all the 
lands granted by an Act of Congress, approved July 
16th, 1894, shall constitute permanent funds, to be 
safely invested and held by the State; and the income 
thereof shall be used exclusively for the support and 
maintenance of the different institutions and colleges, 
respectively, in accordance with the requirements and 
conditions of said Acts of Congress. 91 (Article X was 
amended, effective July 1, 1987 with Section 5 becoming 
Sections 5 and 7). 
Utah Constitution, Article XX, §1: 
All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter 
be granted to the State by Congress, and all lands 
acquired by gift, grant or devise, from any person or 
corporation, or that may otherwise be acquired, are 
hereby accepted, and declared to be the public lands of 
the State; and shall be held in trust for the people, 
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to be disposed of as may be provided by law, for the 
respective purposes for which they have been or may be 
granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired. 
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-23: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, the State Land 
Board shall by rules and regulations prescribe the form 
of application, the form of lease, the annual rental, 
the amount of royalty and the basis upon which the 
royalty shall be computed, and such other details as it 
may deem necessary in the interest of the state. 
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-76: 
All leases and contracts of every kind entered into by 
the State Land Board shall before execution by such 
board be approved as to form by the attorney general. 
30 U.S.C. §207(a): 
[A] lease shall require payment of a royalty in such 
amount as the Secretary shall determine of not less 
than 12 1/2 per centum of the value of coal as defined 
by regulation, except the Secretary may determine a 
lesser amount in the case of coal recovered by 
underground mining operations.... 
43 C.F.R. §3473.3-2: 
2. A lease shall require payment of a royalty of not 
less than 12 1/2% of the value of the coal removed from 
a surface mine. 
3. A lease shall require payment of a royalty of not 
less than 8% of the value of the coal removed from an 
underground mine, except that the (Minerals Management 
Service) may determine a lesser amount, but in no case 
less than 5% if conditions warrant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Utah Division of State Lands audited the payments under 
its coal leases on school trust lands. One of those leases was 
held by Plaintiffs, Consolidation Coal Company and The Pittsburg 
& Midway Coal Mining Company. Demand was made to Plaintiffs to 
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pay royalties found by the audit to have been underpaid. 
Plaintiffs appealed the decision of the auditors to the Board of 
State Lands. The Board, after a hearing, upheld the audit and 
the demand for payment. (R.426, 430-447) Plaintiffs then filed 
this action in the Seventh Judicial District Court asking for a 
declaration that the State could not collect the unpaid 
royalties. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. The trial court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment finding that Plaintiffs owed nothing to the 
State. (Addenda 1 and 2) It is from those Orders that this 
appeal is taken. 
The United States, pursuant to the Utah Enabling Act, 
granted lands to the State of Utah to be used for the support of 
the common schools. The State holds the land as trustee. 
Management of those lands is by the Board of State Lands and the 
Division of State Lands. Utah Code Ann. §65-1-14. 
On February 16, 1960 the State issued to The Kemmer Coal 
Company coal lease no. 25005. (Addendum 3) The lease authorizes 
extraction of coal from school trust lands located in Emery 
County, Utah. The lease is perpetual, as long as coal is 
produced in commercial quantities, with a provision for 
adjustment at the end of each 20-year period. The lease was 
assigned to the Plaintiffs. 
The United States Government owns most of the coal-producing 
lands within the State of Utah; therefore, the royalty charged on 
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federal coal leases generally becomes the prevailing market 
royalty rate for coal leases within the State•1 When State lease 
no. 25005 was issued by the State, the royalty rate on many 
federal coal leases was $.15 per ton. The paragraph (Article III 
Second) requiring the payment of royalty on the subject State 
lease requires Lessees: 
To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day 
of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty 
(a) at the rate of $.15 per ton of 2000 lbs. of coal 
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise 
disposed of, or 
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of the 
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal 
lessees of land of similar character under coal leases 
issued by the United State at that time, 
whichever is higher.... 
State lease no. 25005 also requires the Plaintiffs to 
prepare and forward to the State, each quarter, a certified 
statement as to the amount of production together with other 
information as required by the State Land Board. (Article III, 
Third) The State also retained the right to go upon the premises 
and conduct audits of the lessees' records. (Article XI) 
On August 4, 1976 the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 
1
 Statement of Guy R. Martin, Assistant Secretary of the 
Interior, to the Energy Resources and Materials Production 
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources "Oversight Hearing on the Federal Coal Leasing 
Program," (June 12, 1980), wherein he testified: "Because the 
vast Federal reserves and their locational advantage place the 
government in a powerful market position, the Interior Department 
will be the price setter for western coal." 
5 
1976, 30 U.S.C. §§201-209 was enacted by Congress. The Act and 
the regulations promulgated thereunder, increased the royalty 
rate on surface mines to 12 1/2% of the value of the coal 
produced and the royalty rate on underground mines to 8% of the 
value of the coal produced. Between January 1, 1979 and December 
1, 1986 (the audit period) twenty-four (24) coal leases were 
issued by the United States Bureau of Land Management on lands 
within the State of Utah. (R. 401-404) Nineteen (19) of those 
leases required a royalty payment of 8% of the value of coal. 
(R.401-404) Only one required a royalty rate of less than 8% and 
that royalty rate was 5% of the value of the coal. The adjoining 
States of Colorado, Wyoming and New Mexico have all increased 
their royalty rate to at least 8% of gross sales value of the 
coal extracted. (R.388, 391, 394) 
In 1981 Plaintiffs decided to start mining operations on 
State lease 25005. Plaintiffs sent a letter to John Blake, a 
mineral resource specialist for the Division of State Lands, 
informing him that mining operations would soon commence and that 
Plaintiffs would be paying a royalty of $.175 per ton for the 
coal. (R.204-213) John Blake acknowledged receipt of the letter 
and in accordance with the Division's practice sent Plaintiffs a 
blank reporting form with which to report and pay its royalties. 
(R.420-423) The State did not express an opinion as to whether 
$.175 per ton was the proper rate but rather relied on Plaintiffs 
to pay the correct royalty rate. (R.420-423) Plaintiffs never 
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requested any direction from the Board of State Lands or the 
Director of the Division of State Lands as to what the royalty 
rate should be (R.420-422, 426-431) On July 1, 1983 Plaintiff, 
Consolidation Coal Company, entered into a new federal coal 
lease, No. U50044, located in Emery County which lease required 
payment of royalties at 8% of the value of the coal. (R.401-404) 
Plaintiffs did not increase its royalty rate at that time or at 
any other time but continued to pay royalties at the rate of 
$.175 per ton. 
The lands that the Division of State Lands manages have 
thousands of mineral leases. The Division does not have the 
funds or the personnel to monitor each lease or the payments 
received on those leases. (R.426-427) Instead the State of Utah, 
as written in its lease provisions and regulations, requires its 
lessees to accurately provide information and to pay the correct 
amounts of royalties. (Addendum 3) Like reporting taxes, it has 
largely been an honor reporting system. In 1981 the Utah State 
Legislature appropriated funds for the Division of State Lands to 
hire an auditor to review income from its mineral leases. (R.426) 
Richard Mitchell was hired. (R.397) He set up an auditing 
procedure and started to audit the State's oil and gas leases. 
(R.397) In 1984 the Auditing Division was expanded and two 
auditors, Douglas E. Johnson and Ralph Aiello, were hired. 
(R.406, 415) 
In December of 1984 the auditors started to review the State 
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coal leases. The audit included an analysis of the U.S. Bureau 
of Land Management records on federal coal leases and an 
examination of the Plaintiffs' and other State coal lessee 
records. The auditors found that the coal lessees had, in 
certain instances, under reported production and failed to report 
other vital information. They also found that the royalty rate 
on federal coal leases had increased to 8% beginning in 1977 but 
the Plaintiffs had failed to report and pay royalties at the 
prevailing federal rate. (R.236, 406, 415) 
An audit report was prepared and submitted to the Division 
of State Lands. (R.401, 406) The Director of the Division of 
State Lands establisned an audit committee to review the 
auditors' report. The committee reviewed the lease and the 
findings of the report. Some adjustments were made to the report 
and it was approved. (R.401) The report was then sent to the 
Plaintiffs with a request for payment of the delinquent royalties 
together with interest. (R.23 6) 
The Plaintiffs, upon receipt of the audit report, requested 
a hearing before the Board State Lands. A hearing was held. The 
Board rejected the appeal and upheld the findings of the 
auditors. (R.426, 430-447) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal is from the trial court's grant of a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Summary Judgment is appropriate only when the 
pleadings, depositions, interrogatories and admissions on file, 
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together with affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). This Court 
should consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
Defendants, Durham vs. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977), 
and affirm the decision only if the Court determines there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact and that the 
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Briqgs 
vs. Holcombef 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah 1987). This Court, in 
reviewing the issues of law, gives no deference to the trial 
court. Atlas Corporation vs. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 
229 (Utah 1987). 
The issues before the Court have been decided against 
Plaintiffs by the Board of State Lands. This decision was prior 
to Adkins vs. Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524 (Utah 1986) 
which held that the hearing should have been before the Director 
of the Division of State Lands. The same lease provisions and 
issues in three related cases which are on appeal to this Court 
were decided by the Director who rejected the coal companies 
appeals and upheld the audit. The Court, when reviewing the 
decision of the Director, should not override the Director's 
interpretation of the Division's rules, policies and regulations 
unless his decision is arbitrary or erroneous. This Court should 
only inquire as to whether the Director acted in excess of his 
powers in upholding the audit. McKnight vs. State Land Board, 
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381 P.2d 726, 731 (Utah 1963), Atlantic Richfield Company vs. 
Hinkel, 432 F.2d 587, 591 (10th Cir. 1970). 
The Defendants agree that the controlling issues in the case 
are issues of law. The Defendants maintain that when the issues 
of law are correctly decided they are entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Defendants maintain, however, that there are 
issues of fact in dispute which preclude entry of summary 
judgment for the Plaintiffs. Defendants request that this Court 
review the legal issues, that those issues be decided in favor of 
Defendants, and that the case be remanded with instructions to 
enter judgment in favor of the Defendants. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The State of Utah, as a condition of statehood, 
acquired certain lands in trust for the benefit of the common 
schools. The State has a Constitutional and moral duty to obtain 
full value from the disposition of those lands. The trial court 
placed impermissible restrictions on the trust lands in question 
when it restricted the royalty rate the State could collect from 
those lands to $.175 per ton rather than allowing the State to 
collect the contractually required market rate of 8% of value of 
the coal. 
2. The royalty provision in the coal lease is clear and 
should be given its plain meaning. The requirement that the 
Plaintiffs periodically determine whether the federal royalty 
rate has changed and that it pay royalties on the changed rate 
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does not create an ambiguity. Such provisions are common in 
long-term leases to insure that the parties pay according to 
prevailing market terms. In this case, a fluctuating royalty 
rate is constitutionally required to insure that the trust fund 
receives full value for its lands. 
3. The Court should use rules of construction to clarify 
any ambiguity in the lease. The trial court erred when it 
rewrote the parties' lease by limiting royalties to $.175 per 
ton. The lease should be construed to give meaning to 
subparagraph (b) of the royalty provision which provides for 
periodic increases in the royalty rate. 
4. Estoppel should not be used by the Court to prevent the 
trust fund from receiving full value for its assets. The Utah 
Enabling Act requires the trust to receive full value and 
requires the State to manage the trust fund in its governmental 
capacity. To allow estoppel in this case would violate those 
constitutional requirements and would cost the trust fund in 
excess of two hundred thousand dollars. 
5. The Plaintiffs have suffered no injury, were aware of 
the facts which caused the royalty rate to increase, and had the 
duty to pay the correct royalties. The State is only asking that 
the Plaintiffs pay what is required by the lease. Such a request 
should not be estopped. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
THE TRUST ASSETS OF THE STATE SCHOOL TRUST LANDS MAY 
NOT BE DEPLETED FOR LESS THAN FULL VALUE. 
The State lands which are subject to the coal lease in 
question are school trust lands. The interpretation of the lease 
and the other issues that were before the trial court were 
subject to rules of law established by the Utah Enabling Act, 
Constitutional provisions and case law. The trial court 
erroneously rejected the law governing school trust lands in its 
construction of the lease and in its holding that the State was 
estopped from obtaining fair market value for its trust lands. 
This argument will first set forth a brief historical background 
on the purpose and policy of trust lands and will then examine 
the case law which the trial court should have applied in 
deciding this case. 
A. The Historical Background Provides Essential 
Perspective. 
Utah is one of thirty (30) public land states whose Enabling 
Act granted lands to be used for the support of schools and 
institutions. L. Mall, Public Land and Mining Law, 44-47 [3 Ed. 
1981]. In Utah vs. Kleepe, 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978) rev'd 
on other grounds 446 U.S. 500 (1980) the Court explained the 
purpose of the school land grants: 
There were no federal lands within the borders of the 
original thirteen states when they adopted and ratified 
the United States Constitution. Thus, virtually all of 
the lands within their borders were subject to 
taxation, including taxation necessary for the 
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maintenance of their public school systems. When other 
states were subsequently admitted into the Union, their 
territorial confines were "carved" from federal 
territories. The "public lands" owned and reserved by 
the United States within those territorial confines 
were not subject to taxation. This reservation by the 
United States created serious impediment to the "public 
land" states in relation to an adequate property tax 
base necessary to permit these states to operate and 
maintain essential government services, including the 
public school systems. It was in recognition thereof, 
i.e., in order to "equalize" the status of the newly 
admitted states with that of the original thirteen 
states, that the Congress enacted the federal land 
grant statutes. The specific purpose was to create a 
binding permanent trust which would generate financial 
aid to support the public school systems of the "public 
land" states. 
Id. at 758. 
The Utah Enabling Act granted four (4) sections of land in 
each township for the support of the common schools. Utah 
Enabling Act §6. The State of Utah, in its Constitution, 
accepted those lands in trust for the respective purposes for 
which they had been granted. Constitution of Utah, Article XX. 
B. The Law Requires The Receipt Of Full Value From 
The Disposition Of Trust Lands. 
The school land grants constitute a solemn agreement between 
the United States and the State of Utah. There has been imposed 
upon the State of Utah: 
[a] binding and perpetual obligation to use the granted 
lands for the support of public education. All revenue 
from the sale or lease of the school grants was 
impressed with a trust in favor of the public schools. 
No State could divert school lands to other public 
purposes without compensating the trust for the full 
market value of the interest taken. 
Andrus vs. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 523-524, 64 L.Ed.2d 458, 474, 100 
Sup. Ct. 1803 (1981). 
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Beginning with the case of Trustees of Vincennes University 
vs. State of Indiana, 55 U.S. 268, 274 (1852) the Supreme Court 
of the United States has consistently held that a State holds 
school lands in trust for the benefit of its schools. Congress 
and the Courts have placed restrictions on the use of the trust 
lands so that they are not exploited for private advantage or 
depleted by State action or inaction. Lassen vs. Arizona, 385 
U.S. 458, 87 S.Ct. 584, 17 L.Ed.2d 515, 522 (1967). (While 
Lassen dealt with surface rights, recent cases make it clear that 
these restrictions also apply to mineral interests located in 
school trust lands. Jensen vs. Dinehart, 645 P.2d 32, 35 (Utah 
1982), Alamo Land and Cattle Company vs. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 
96 S.Ct. 910, 47 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). 
The duty of the State, in managing mineral rights on trust 
lands, is to obtain full value for the trust assets: 
The royalty rate set by the state is important because 
it represents payment for a trust asset which will be 
gone forever once the mineral is removed from the 
ground. Therefore, the requirements of the Enabling 
Act and the trust concept are the most important 
factors to consider in determining an optimum royalty 
rate. If the rate is too low the state will be 
committing a breach of trust by diminishing the trust. 
Royalty payments are placed in a permanent trust fund, 
the corpus of which is invested; the trust is kept 
whole if fair market value is received. If the royalty 
rate is too low the trust will not be kept whole. 
3 State School Trust Lands and Oil and Gas Royalty Rates. Public 
Land Law Review, 119, 130 (1982). See also Kadish vs. Arizona 
State Land Department, 747 P.2d 1183, 1195 (Ariz. 1987). State 
vs. Kleepe, supra at 758; State vs. University of Alaska, 624 
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P.2d 807, 813 (Alaska 1981). 
To enforce this important trust purpose, the Courts have 
consistently rejected any State statutes, constitutional 
provisions and Court-imposed doctrines which restrict the State 
from obtaining full value from the trust lands. In Kadish vs. 
Arizona State Land Department, supra, the Supreme Court of 
Arizona held unconstitutional an Arizona statute that fixed a 
flat royalty rate for mineral leases on state school trust lands. 
The court noted that federal law is supreme in this field and 
that: 
[n]either this court, nor the legislature, nor the 
people may alter or amend the trust provisions 
contained in the Enabling Act without congressional 
approval. 
Id. at 1185. The court said that the Enabling Act intended to 
severely circumscribe the power of state government to deal with 
the assets of the common school fund. It analyzed the court 
cases dealing with this subject and pointed out that: 
[t]he courts have consistently construed the scope of 
federal land grants in favor of the government. In 
dealing with trust land ... all doubts must be resolved 
in favor of protecting and preserving trust purposes. 
Id. at 1195. 
The primary case discussing the Utah Enabling Act is State 
of Utah vs. Kleepe, supra. That case dealt with the State's "in 
lieu11 selections of additional lands to replace lands the State 
had not received pursuant to the Enabling Act. The Court, after 
reviewing the Utah Enabling Act and the historical development of 
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trust lands, stated: 
The school land grant and its acceptance by the state 
constitutes a solemn compact between the United States 
and the state for the benefit of the state's public 
school system. 
Id. at 758. 
Recent cases from other jurisdictions have consistently 
rejected attempts to limit the income received by the school 
trust. In Anderson vs. Board of Education, 256 N.W.2d 318 (Neb. 
1977) the Nebraska Supreme Court approved the resal.e of school 
trust property after a higher upset bid was received after the 
first sale. It stated that the constitution: 
imposes on the Board the duty of obtaining the highest 
price possible for all trust property it may sell. 
Id. at 321. 
In Oklahoma Education Association vs. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 
(Ok. 1981) the Supreme Court of Oklahoma struck down a law 
authorizing low-interest loans to farmers from the funds of the 
school trust fund. In doing so the court said: 
No disposition of such lands or funds can be made that 
conflict either with the terms and purposes of the 
grant in the Enabling Act or the provisions of the 
Constitution relating to such land and funds. The 
State has an irrevocable duty, as Trustee, to manage 
the trust estate for the exclusive benefit of the 
beneficiaries, and return full value from the use and 
disposition of the trust property. 
Id. at 235. 
In County of Skamania vs. Washington, 685 P.2d 576, 582 
(Wash. 1984) a state statute which allowed purchasers of timber 
from trust lands to default so as to avoid insolvency on the part 
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of timber purchases was held unconstitutional. 
In Alamo Land and Cattle Company vs. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 
3 05 (197 6), the federal government condemned school trust lands 
including sections leased as grazing lands. Commenting on the 
validity of a school trust leasehold made for less than fair 
value, the court considered a protective provision contained in 
the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act which provided against the 
initial selling of lease rentals at less than fair value. The 
United States Supreme Court held that if the lease of trust lands 
was for a rental of substantially less than the land's then fair 
value, the lease was void. 
The Courts consistently hold that entities, such as the 
Plaintiffs, are charged with knowledge of the trust and are also 
subject to the duty to obtain full value for the trust. State 
vs. Phillips Petroleum Company, 258 P.2d 1193, 1199 (Ok. 1953), 
State vs. Lamacus, 263 P.2d 426, 427 (Ok. 1953), Seidel vs. 
Seward, 133 NW.2d 390, 391 (Neb. 1965), State vs. Board of 
Educational Lands and Funds of Nebraska, 65 NW.2d 392, 397 (Neb. 
1954) and Department of State Lands vs. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948, 
957 (Mont. 1985). 
C. Trust Land Law And Policy Should Be Applied To The 
Facts Of This Case. 
The State of Utah has the duty to receive full market value 
from the disposition of its school trust lands. The market 
royalty rate on coal leases in the State of Utah is controlled by 
the United States which has the vast majority of coal reserves. 
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Lessees require long-term leases because of the capital 
expenditures involved. It would have been an impermissible 
restriction on the trust assets if the State would have set a 
flat rate per ton royalty on its long term coal leases. Kadish 
vs. Arizona State Land Department, supra at 1195. It is equally 
impermissible for the court to judicially set the royalty rate at 
a set amount per ton. The State therefore, drafted an escalator 
clause in its coal lease which tied the royalty provision to the 
prevailing federal rate. That escalator clause insured that the 
State would, throughout the term of the lease, receive full 
market value. 
The State, also implemented rules and regulations which 
provide for interest and penalties on delinquent royalty 
payments. Those provisions further insure that the trust 
receives full market value; otherwise, the trust would be 
depleted as a result of the time value of money. Bjork vs. April 
Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977). 
The Plaintiffs, as a party dealing with the trust and 
pursuant to the terms of the lease, had the duty to pay the 
correct amount of royalty. When an audit was performed by the 
State it showed that the Plaintiffs owed to the trust fund in 
excess of two hundred thousand dollars. (R.236) The trial court, 
by refusing to enforce the escalator provision of the lease, by 
refusing to require the payment of interest on delinquent 
royalties, and by amending the lease to limit royalties to $.175 
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per ton imposed constitutionally impermissible restrictions on 
the trust fund. That decision, in this case, costs the trust 
fund, as of the audit, $197,193.04 with an ongoing loss of 
approximately $2.00 per ton for coal produced after the audit. 
The contract created by the trial court runs directly counter to 
the law and public policy of this State. Thus, the court below 
is in the anomalous position of having written a contract which 
violates "the generally accepted doctrine of this country that 
every contract in violation of law is void." Baker vs. Latses, 
60 Utah 38, 44, 206 P.2d 533, 555 (1922). See also, Haddock vs. 
Salt Lake City, 23 Utah 52, 65 P. 491 (1901) (holding void as 
against public policy a contract to pay fees for service of legal 
processes where the fees set in the contract were different from 
the fees set by statute); Boise-Payette Lumber Company vs. 
Challis Independent School District, No. 1 of Custer County, 4 6 
Id. 403, 268 P. 26 (1928) (holding that judicial determinations 
of public policy must recognize and yield to any applicable 
legislative enactments). 
The instant case should be reversed and remanded to the 
trial court with instructions that the escalator clause be 
enforced and that the trust fund receive royalty rates at the 
prevailing market rate of 8% of the value of the coal removed 
together with interest as provided by the regulations. 
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POINT II. THE ESCALATION CLAUSE RELATING TO ROYALTIES 
IS CLEAR; THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE PLAINTIFFS DETERMINE 
THE PREVAILING FEDERAL ROYALTY RATE DOES NOT MAKE THE 
CLAUSE AMBIGUOUS. 
The Court, as a matter of law, is to give the provisions of 
a contract their plain meaning as ascertained from the instrument 
itself. The Court should look to the entire instrument and give 
meaning to all provisions. Utah Valley Bank vs. Tanner, 636 P.2d 
1060, 1061 (Utah 1981), Hal Taylor Associates vs. Union America, 
Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982). The trial court erred when 
it ignored the plain meaning of the royalty provision and the 
intent of the parties when entering into the contract and rewrote 
the lease deleting the escalator provision of the royalty clause. 
A reading of the royalty provision in the lease (Article III 
Second) shows that it is clear and complies with the intent of 
the parties that the trust lands receive the going royalty rate. 
It states that the royalty rate will be $.15 per ton (which was 
the federal rate when the lease was signed) or if the prevailing 
federal rate increases on similar lands then the royalty rate 
increases to that new rate. The trial court was apparently under 
the misconception that because the escalator clause required the 
Plaintiffs to determine the prevailing rate from facts outside 
the lease that somehow an ambiguity was created. Such a 
provision is not defective if there is a formula or method to set 
the price. Ferris vs. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 359 (Utah 1979). 
Escalator clauses in long-term mineral leases are common 
provisions. Almost all escalator clauses or "favored nation" 
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clauses require the parties to ascertain a fluctuating rate from 
facts outside the body of the lease. See e.g. Energy Reserves 
Group, Inc., vs. Kansas Power and Light Company, 459 U.S. 400, 
417 (1983), Amoco Production Company vs. Stauffer Chemical 
Company of Wyoming, 612 P.2d 463, 468 (Wyo. 1980), Lonestar Gas 
Company vs. The Howard Corporation, 556 S.W.2d 372, 376 (Tx. 
1977) . The ascertaining of facts outside the lease, to put into 
effect the lease provisions, does not create an ambiguity. 
Instead, such provisions are drafted to insure that rates, such 
as royalty rates, are tied to the market price thereby protecting 
both parties during the term of the lease. 
The royalty provision contained in the contract provides a 
formula for fixing the payment price. Subsection (b) of the 
provision states that the royalty payment to be paid by the 
Plaintiffs are determined by the prevailing federal rate on lands 
of similar character under coal leases issued by the federal 
government. Plaintiffs had the duty to determine any change in 
the federal royalty rate. The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments 
Act of 1976 increased the royalty rate to 8% of the value of the 
coal produced on federal coal leases. The federal government 
owns the majority of coal reserves in Utah. Since 1979, 19 of 24 
coal leases issued by the federal government in the State require 
a royalty payment of 8% of value. In addition, the adjoining 
states of Colorado, Wyoming and New Mexico have increased the 
royalty rate to at least 8% of the value of coal produced under 
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their leases. Plaintiffs hold numerous federal leases in Utah, 
part of which require an 8% royalty. Those facts when applied to 
the royalty provision require that a royalty rate of 8% of value 
be paid to the trust fund. 
The plain meaning of the provision is that the royalty rate 
to be paid by the Plaintiffs would change when the federal 
royalty rate increased. The Plaintiffs do not argue that $.175 
is the prevailing federal rate for federal leases of land of 
similar character and concede that the federal rate has increased 
since the lease was signed. Plaintiffs, to avoid paying the 
correct royalty, instead tries to claim the lease is ambiguous. 
A reading of the plain language of the lease, coupled with the 
law governing trust lands, and the change in federal royalty 
rates support only one construction of the lease. That 
construction is that the prevailing federal rate on underground 
coal leases has increased to 8% of value and that Plaintiffs must 
pay royalties at that rate to provide full value to the trust. 
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POINT III. THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT IGNORED THE LAW 
REGARDING TRUST LANDS, THE ESCALATOR PROVISIONS OF THE 
LEASE, AND THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES, AND IMPOSED A 
FLAT $.175 PER TON ROYALTY RATE. 
A. Any Ambiguous Provision Should Be Resolved By 
Rules Of Construction Instead Of Being Deleted From The 
Lease. 
If the Court determines there is an ambiguity in the lease 
then the Court should apply certain rules of construction to 
interpret or clarify the ambiguous provision. The Court should 
not delete or rewrite the contract. Those rules of construction 
are: (1) the intent of the parties when entering into the 
contract controls the meaning of the contract, Utah Valley Bank 
vs. Tanner, supra at 1061; (2) existing law which affects the 
provision is considered part of the contract and governs its 
construction, Robinson vs. Joint School District, 596 P. 2d 436, 
438 (Ida. 1979), Farmers Investment Company vs. Pima Mining 
Company, 523 P.2d 487, 489 (Az. 1974); (3) consideration should 
be given to the subject matter, nature and purpose of the 
contract and the motives of the parties, Nagle vs. Club 
Fontainbleu, 405 P.2d 346, 348 (Utah 1965); (4) the contract 
should be viewed from the perspective of the parties at the time 
it was signed, DeBouis vs. Nigh, 584 P. 2d 823, 824 (Utah 1978); 
(5) the court should give the entire contract meaning and not 
ignore any of the provisions of the contract or rewrite the 
contract, Hal Taylor Associates vs. Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d 
743, 749 (Utah 1982); and (6) the contract must be construed 
liberally to protect the public interest, Public Service Company 
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vs. Denver, 387 P.2d 33, 36 (Colo. 1963), Restatement of 
Contracts 2d §207. 
If these rules of construction are applied to the royalty 
provision, the interpretation given by the State is the correct 
and reasonable one. The State, as trustee, is required to have a 
royalty provision which provides a maximum value to the trust 
fund. A royalty rate that would fluctuate as market conditions 
changed is required. To have set a flat royalty rate would have 
been unconstitutional. Kadish vs. Arizona State Land Department, 
supra at 1195. The Federal Government owns the majority of coal 
reserves in the State of Utah; therefore, the royalty rate 
charged by the Federal Government constitutes the prevailing 
market rate in the State of Utah. At the time the lease 
provision was drafted the federal royalty rate was generally $.15 
per ton. The royalty provision, therefore, was drafted setting a 
minimum royalty of $.15 per ton, but providing an escalator 
clause tied to the prevailing federal royalty rate. The 
escalator clause was required by law and the obvious intent of 
the parties when the contract was entered into was to provide a 
mechanism whereby the State would always receive the going market 
royalty rate from its trust lands. When one ties that 
information and construction to the undisputed facts it shows 
that the federal royalty rate was generally $.10 to $.175 per ton 
until 1976. At that time the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act 
was passed and as a result the royalty rate on federal leases was 
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increased to 8%, The undisputed facts show that from 1979 to the 
present all newly issued federal leases in Utah, except for one, 
were at the rate of 8% or greater. The Director of State Lands 
has properly construed the State coal lease to require payment of 
royalties at 8%. 
B. The Plaintiffs Have Never Contended That The 
Royalty Should Always Remain At $.15 Per Ton. 
One of the things that is certain about the royalty 
provision, in addition to the plain meaning of subsection (b), is 
that the contracting parties intended that the royalty rate would 
change if federal royalty rates increased. Plaintiffs argue that 
the Court should look at past practices of the parties to 
determine the meaning of the royalty provision. Plaintiffs 
misconstrue the past practices of the parties. The past 
practices actually support the audit. The past practices show 
that when Plaintiffs decided to start mining in 1981 they knew 
that subparagraph (b) of the royalty provision applied. 
Plaintiffs therefore sent the State a letter stating that it 
would be paying royalties at $.175 per ton which was the rate 
Plaintiffs paid on a federal lease in the area. Plaintiffs did 
not inform the State of the 8% rates being paid on new federal 
leases being issued in the area. The State relied on Plaintiffs, 
as provided in the lease, to properly report and pay royalties. 
The State therefore acknowledged receipt of Plaintiffs May 19, 
1981 letter and sent Plaintiffs blank forms to report its 
royalties. The State's letter did not express a position as to 
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whether the rate proposed by Plaintiffs was accurate. In 198 3 
Plaintiffs acquired a new federal lease in the area (U50044) 
which required a royalty rate of 8%. Plaintiffs did not notify 
the State of its new lease nor did Plaintiffs increase their 
royalty payments to 8%. 
Plaintiffs do not argue that $.15 or $.175 is the prevailing 
federal rate for federal leases on land of similar character 
under coal leases issued by the United States during the time 
period covered by the audit. They have conceded that the rate 
has increased and subparagraph (b) applies. However, because 
Plaintiffs do not like the higher rate, Plaintiffs claim 
ambiguity and that they should be allowed to continue to pay at 
$.175 per ton. This has nothing to do with the intent of either 
party at the time of the execution of the lease. Indeed, that 
so-called interpretation flatly contradicts the parties' intent 
at the time it was signed. In this particular case the 
undisputed facts establish that the prevailing federal rate is 8% 
of value which is the rate Plaintiffs pay to the federal 
government on most of its other leases. Any changes in the rate 
can be easily determined by review of Bureau of Land Management 
records. 
C. State Statutes Prohibit The Amending Of The Lease 
Without The Land Board's Approval. 
There is a difference between construing a provision and 
ignoring it. To ignore and not enforce subparagraph (b) of the 
royalty provision of the lease constitutes a rewriting of the 
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terms of the lease without the necessary approval of the 
Director, the Land Board or the Attorney General. Morgan vs. 
Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976). Utah Code 
Ann. §65-1-76 requires: 
All leases and contracts of every kind entered into by 
the State Land Board shall before execution by such 
board be approved as to form by the attorney general. 
§65-1-23 Utah Code Ann., requires: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, the State Land 
Board shall by rules and regulations prescribe the form 
of application, the form of lease, the annual rental, 
the amount of royalty and the basis upon which the 
royalty shall be computed, and such other details as it 
may deem necessary in the interest of the state. 
The trial court should not be allowed to unilaterally 
rewrite the parties' lease. If there is an ambiguity, the trial 
court should be directed to apply proper rules of construction to 
clarify the ambiguity and give meaning to all of the royalty 
provisions. 
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POINT IV. ESTOPPEL IS NOT AVAILABLE IN THIS CASE. 
The traditional rule is that the doctrine of estoppel cannot 
be asserted against a state government in matters affecting 
public policy, public revenues or when the state is acting in its 
governmental capacity. Estoppel is not applied in matters where 
an action is prohibited by a state statute or is the result of 
unauthorized acts of State officials. Atlantic Richfield Company 
vs. Hinkel, 432 F.2d 587, 591 (10th Cir. 1970). 
There are many good reasons for this rule including 
safeguarding public funds and interests which are subject to 
changes in political opinions and changes in public officials and 
employees. Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company, 646 P.2d 
715, 718 (Utah 1982) . Restrictions on the application of legal 
doctrines when public lands are involved is common such as in the 
area of eminent domain, Utah Code Ann. §78-34-3 or adverse 
possession. There are even greater restrictions and protections 
when trust funds and trust lands are involved because of the 
constitutional requirements and important policies. 
The trial court's ruling that the State was estopped from 
enforcing the royalty provisions of the lease was wrong for the 
following reasons: (a) the important policies and law governing 
trust lands prohibits the use of estoppel when the doctrine is 
used to diminish the income received by the trust fund; (b) the 
State acts in its governmental capacity when managing trust lands 
and is subject to estoppel in only limited circumstances; and (c) 
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the undisputed facts will not support a finding of estoppel. 
A. The Important Policy Of Receiving Full Value For 
The Trust Fund Prohibits The Use Of Estoppel. 
The trial court erred when it concluded that Defendants were 
estopped as a matter of law from enforcing the terms of the lease 
and obtaining full value for the trust fund. Courts which have 
considered whether estoppel should be applied when it would 
reduce the income to school trust lands have consistently held 
that the important public policy of providing full value to the 
trust lands prohibits the imposition of a defense such as 
estoppel. 
In State vs. Phillips Petroleum Company, 258 P.2d 1193 (Ok. 
1953) the clerk for the State failed to reserve minerals when 
issuing a certificate of purchase for land. The Court, in 
allowing reformation of the documents restoring the mineral 
rights to the State, held that the State was acting in a 
governmental capacity and that it would be a violation of the 
State's trust responsibilities to allow divestiture of the 
mineral rights. Furthermore, the court said that the purchaser 
is charged with notice that the State is acting as a trustee and 
is charged with notice that the State could only act in 
compliance with rules and regulations of its position as trustee. 
The Court held that the doctrine of estoppel did not apply to 
those acts which were beyond the authority of the State employee 
when he issued the deed and failed to reserve the mineral rights. 
Id. at 1199. The State employee in this case had no authority, 
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either intentionally or accidentally, to set a royalty rate lower 
than the prevailing federal rate. 
In State vs. Northwest Maqnesite Company, 182 P.2d 643 
(Wash. 1947) the Commissioner of public lands promised the lessee 
of school trust lands that the lessee could remit royalties on 
the basis of net profits. That representation was contrary to 
the statute and the lease. The Court, in holding that the lessee 
was required to pay royalties in accordance with the terms of the 
lease, held that the State was acting in a governmental capacity, 
that estoppel could not be used to enforce the promise of the 
Commissioner of Public Lands, that Defendant's payment of money 
did not constitute an estoppel, and that the State was entitled 
to interest on the unpaid royalties. Id. at 662. 
In the case of Department of State Lands vs. Pettibone, 702 
P.2d 948 (Mont. 1985), Defendants claimed that they were entitled 
to certain water rights. The Montana Supreme Court denied 
Defendants' claim and found that the water rights were part of 
the school trust lands of the State of Montana. The Court held 
that there were three important principals governing school trust 
lands. Those principals were: (1) the Enabling Act created a 
trust which the State could not violate; (2) the Enabling Act was 
to be strictly construed according to fiduciary principles; and 
(3) the Enabling Act pre-empted State laws and constitutions. It 
further held that Courts are to be very protective of the trust 
and emphatic of the need to preserve the value of the trust 
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corpus• The Court also found that an interest in State land 
cannot be conveyed without adequate compensation and that any use 
or management which would devalue State lands is impermissible. 
It said that anyone who acquires an interest in trust lands does 
so subject to the trust and that trust lands are subject to a 
different set of rules than other public lands. Xd. at 956. 
The holdings in the above cases are consistent with the 
manner in which this Court has decided issues involving estoppel 
against the State. The general rule in Utah is that an estoppel 
cannot be applied against the State if to do so would violate 
State statute. Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company, 
supra at 719. In the case at hand, the application of an 
estoppel would be a violation of both State statutes and the 
Constitution of Utah. Even if the Court determines that estoppel 
could apply, the Plaintiffs must prove that estoppel is necessary 
to prevent manifest injustice and the public interest would not 
be unduly damaged by imposing the defense. Utah State University 
vs. Sutro and Company, 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982), Celebrity 
Club, Inc., vs. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689, 694 
(Utah 1979). In Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company the 
Court stated: 
[t]he rule which precludes the assertion of estoppel 
against the government is sound and generally should be 
applied, except only in appropriate circumstances as 
hereinabove stated, where the interest of justice 
mandates an exception to the general rule. In cases 
where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is 
whether it appears that the facts may be found with 
sufficient certainty, and the injustice to be suffered 
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is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception. 
Id. at 720. 
The essential policy and public interest in trust land cases 
is the requirement that the trust fund receive full value for its 
assets. To allow the application of estoppel in this case would 
defeat that purpose. As pointed out in Utah State University vs. 
Sutro and Company and Celebrity Club, Inc., vs. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied 
when it would violate such an important public purpose. See 
also, Western Kane County Service District vs. Jackson Cattle 
Company, 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987) (reversing a ruling 
based on estoppel and stating fl[w]e are extremely reluctant to 
apply the doctrine of estoppel against the assertion of rights in 
a public highway by a governmental entity"). 
In addition, there is no manifest injustice involved. An 
assertion of manifest injustice requires the Plaintiffs to prove 
with certainty that paying royalties at $.17 5 per ton is a higher 
purpose than that of the trust fund receiving full value for its 
assets. Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company, supra at 
718. The injustice in this case is the trial court's application 
of estoppel giving the Plaintiffs a windfall at the expense of 
the school trust fund. 
B. Estoppel Is Applicable Only In Very Limited 
Circumstances When The State Is Acting In Its 
Governmental Capacity. 
The question of whether the State of Utah acted in its 
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governmental or proprietary capacity when managing school trust 
lands was considered by the Utah Supreme Court in Duchesne County 
vs. State Tax Commission, 140 P.2d 335 (Utah 1943). This Court 
held: 
Here the trusteeship of the fund was vested in the 
State by the Enabling Act as a condition of statehood, 
as a condition to the right of the State to be born, 
and imposed upon the State at its birth by the 
instrument of its creation as a condition of its life 
as a government. It must therefore be held by the 
state in a governmental capacity. 
Id. at 343. 
This ruling is in line with rulings in other states which 
have considered the issue as well as the present case law of the 
State of Utah regarding the distinction between proprietary 
functions and governmental functions as to which the State 
retains its immunity. A governmental function has been defined 
as a function which is performed only by a government entity and 
is essential to the core of governmental activity. Cox vs. Utah 
Land and Mortgage Corporation, 716 P.2d 783, 785 (Utah 1986), 
Metropolitan Financial Company vs. State, 714 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 
198 6) . The Utah Legislature has recently expanded that 
definition to include non-essential as well as essential 
governmental activities. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2(4)(a). The 
management of school trust lands is an obligation imposed upon 
the State by a federal statute and accepted by the Utah 
Constitution. It is an activity that can only be performed by 
the State. 
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As already established, the Court must be extremely 
reluctant to apply estoppel when the State is acting in its 
governmental capacity. When public lands are involved, still 
more restrictive rules govern. For example, adverse possession 
cannot be applied against public lands. Peterson vs. Johnson, 34 
P.2d 697, 698 (Utah 1934). Great protection is given to trust 
lands because doctrines such as estoppel or adverse possession 
defeat constitutional requirements to receive full value for the 
trust and violate the State's governmental powers. Department of 
State Lands vs. Pettibone, supra at 952. 
It is hard to imagine any other act of the State which would 
be more governmental in nature than the trust responsibilities 
imposed bv the Enabling Act and accepted by the State in its 
Constitution and as a requirement to obtain statehood. Estoppel 
cannot be used to prevent the State from functioning in this 
important government capacity. 
C. Estoppel Would Prohibit The State From Correcting 
Errors Found Through The Audit Process. 
The audit, by the State, of Plaintiffs' records showed that 
in addition to underreporting the royalty rate Plaintiffs also 
did not report the production of 1,389.42 tons. (R.618) 
Plaintiffs do not claim the State is estopped from collecting for 
that production even through the State accepted, without 
objection, inaccurate quarterly reports and payments for the 
quarters involved. Where is the line between what Plaintiffs 
claim is subject to estoppel and that which is not subject to 
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estoppel? 
One of the problems with asserting the doctrine of estoppel, 
in a case such as this, is that it is of no value for the State 
to audit its lessees. When the Plaintiffs or any other lessee, 
holding a State lease, reports an incorrect royalty rate, an 
incorrect sales price, incorrect production or any other factor 
going into the calculation of the royalty those errors are only 
discovered when an audit is made. If the State has to make an 
audit each time a payment comes in and determine immediately the 
accuracy of each report, the public interest will be severely 
damaged. It is impossible for the State to audit each report 
when it is received. Therefore, the lease and State procedure 
requires the lessee to accurately report and pay royalties. The 
State then conducts periodic audits to insure compliance. 
D. The Undisputed Facts Do Not Support A Finding Of 
Estoppel. 
The trial court erred when it concluded that the State was 
estopped from collecting delinquent royalty payments. Its 
finding that the Plaintiffs had relied on the State's lack of 
protest and had mined the coal in reliance upon a royalty rate of 
$.175 per ton was wrong. The facts upon which reliance and 
detriment could correctly be founded were disputed by the 
Defendants. Indeed, the undisputed facts showed that it was the 
State that relied on the Plaintiffs to pay the correct royalty 
amount. The Plaintiffs had the duty to the State to calculate 
and pay the correct royalty. Plaintiffs concede they are liable 
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for failure to report all their production of the lease. The 
State did not have a duty to Plaintiffs to collect the correct 
royalty although it has such a duty to the school trust. 
If the doctrine of estoppel were applicable in this case the 
Plaintiffs must prove: (1) a false representation or concealment 
of a material fact; (2) made with knowledge of the facts; (3) 
made to a party without knowledge or the means of knowledge of 
the real facts; (4) made with the intention that the 
representation be acted upon; and (5) the parties to whom the 
representation was made, relied or acted upon is injured. Colman 
vs. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 790 (Utah 1987). 
One is not entitled to rely on erroneous or unauthorized 
statements of a government employee. Dansie vs. Murray City, 560 
P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1977), Atlantic Richfield vs. Hickel, supra 
at 591. If a person has the means to determine the actual facts 
estoppel does not apply. Morgan vs. Board of State Lands, supra. 
To claim estoppel against the government, the injury must be 
substantial. Paying what is owed under the lease is not an 
injury. Barnes vs. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1988); Williams vs. 
PSC, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988); and Utah Department of 
Transportation vs. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 751 P.2d 270 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The undisputed facts will not support a finding of estoppel. 
It was the Plaintiffs who was responsible to correctly report the 
royalty rate and payments. It was the Plaintiffs who had coal 
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leases with the federal government and who were aware of the 
increase in the federal royalty rate (R.37 6, 401) and it was the 
State that relied on the Plaintiffs to accurately report and 
accurately pay the correct royalty amount. (R.42 6) It is the 
Plaintiffs that have conceded liability of failure to correctly 
report production but somehow claim they have no liability for 
incorrectly reporting the royalty rate. (R.618) The undisputed 
facts support a finding of estoppel against the Plaintiffs and 
not in favor of the Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs claimed that there were certain representations 
made by John Blake, Mineral Resource Specialist, that the royalty 
rate was $.175 per ton. The State denies there was any agreement 
as to the royalty rate. The State sent Plaintiffs a blank 
reporting form and relied on Plaintiffs to correctly report the 
rate as it changed. (R.420) Plaintiffs admit there was not a 
decision by the Director or the Board of State Lands regarding 
what was a correct rate to be paid by Plaintiffs. On the matter 
in issue the State was silent. Silence by the State will not 
support estoppel, especially when the State did not know the 
facts but was relying on the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also claim 
they would have not mined the State coal lease if the royalty 
rate had been increased and allege that they will incur a loss if 
required to pay the increased royalty rate. During the time 
period in question, Plaintiffs were entering into leases with the 
Federal Government for adjacent lands and was paying 8% royalties 
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on that lease. (R.376, 401) Plaintiffs will only be required to 
pay what the lease requires. Such does not constitute injury. 
Barnes vs. Wood, supra, Williams vs. PSC, supra. If this Court 
determines that the doctrine of estoppel could apply in this 
case, then the matter should be remanded to the trial court for 
trial with Plaintiffs having the burden to prove it has met the 
elements required for estoppel. 
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CONCLUSION 
The law requires that the State of Utah receive a maximum 
return on its disposition of school trust lands. The State 
implemented that requirement by linking the royalty rate on the 
lease to the prevailing federal royalty rate. The decision of 
the trial court imposes improper restrictions on the trust lands. 
The State asks this Court to reverse the decision of the trial 
court and remand the case with instructions to enter judgment in 
favor of the State of Utah upholding the decision of the Director 
of State Lands. 
Respectfully submitted this /(^day of/September, 1988. 
NIELSEN / SENIOR 




Gayle rf\ McKeachnie 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY, 
THE PITTSBURG & MIDWAY COAL 
MINING COMPANY, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ! 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE ] 
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH ] 
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE ] 
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND ] 
FORESTRY; THE UTAH BOARD OF ] 
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; THE ] 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL ] 
RESOURCES; DEE HANSEN, ] 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ] 




I ON MOTIONS FOR 
1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 Civil No. 4779 
The plaintiff seeks a partial summary judgment from 
the Court declaring that the royalty provision contained in the 
State Lease of the defendants is ambiguous and that it should 
be construed in light of the parties course of performance; 
that the lease is not self-executing so as to place a legal 
obligation on plaintiffs to pay a higher rate of royalty after 
the State accepted without qualification the payment of the 
stated rate of $.17^ per ton of coal produced; that the 
defendants may not retroactively apply their new policy 
imposing a royalty rate of 8%; that the defendants are estopped 
from demanding payment of royalties on coal mined during the 
audit period at a rate higher than that paid by plaintiffs and 
accepted by defendants; that the defendants have waived their 
right to demand a higher royalty rate than the one accepted 
during the audit period; and that the ruling of the State 
relative to imposing interest and penalties cannot be legally 
enforced. 
The defendants have objected to the granting of the 
Motion and have submitted their own Motion for Summary Judgment 
asking the Court to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state 
a cause of action; ordering the plaintiffs to pay the 
delinquent royalty payment as determined on the basis of 8% of 
gross sales value during the audit period; ordering that the 
plaintiffs owe interest on delinquent royalty payments at a 
rate set by the Board of State Lands and, further, ordering 
that the plaintiffs owe penalties on delinquent royalties 
pursuant to the regulation set by the Board. 
Each of the parties have submitted their Memorandums 
of Legal Points and Authorities and have presented to the Court 
Affidavits and Exhibits which the Court has read and considered 
and the Court heard oral arguments from the parties on February 
16, 1988, and took this matter under advisement and rules on 
the Motions as hereinafter stated. 
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Certain undisputed facts are, for the most part, 
agreed upon by the parties as setforth in their respective 
memorandums, and the Court will not attempt to detail all of 
those undisputed facts except as necessary for the disposition. 
of these motions. It is undisputed that the plaintiffs came 
into ownership of a coal lease on State lands in approximately 
1978; that the lease was on the standard form provided by and 
prepared by the State Land Board, and provided for royalty as 
follows: 
"Article III, Second: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on 
or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter, 
royalty 
(a) at the rate of 15c per ton of 2000 lbs of coal 
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise 
disposed of, or 
(b) at the rate prevailing at the beginning of the 
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal leases of 
land of similar character under coal leases issued by the 
United States at that time, 
whichever is higher. . . ." 
During 1978, plaintiffs1 employees contacted Mr. 
Blake of the Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry 
regarding the required royalty payment. At that time, the 
plaintiffs were told that because of some confusion in the 
application of the royalty provision, they could not commence 
mining until an agreement was reached on the royalty rate. 
That thereafter, an agreement was reached to the effect that 
the royalty rate would be 15c a ton for coal mined, which was 
the same rate as that charged on a Federal Lease held by the 
No mining was performed by the plaintiffs on the 
property until 1981. Prior to commencing mining, the 
plaintiffs1 employees attempted to confirm the royalty rate 
with the Division of State Lands and Forestry by again 
contacting Mr. Blake of the Department of Natural Resources. 
Mr. Blake informed the plaintiffs that the rate of royalty 
would be 17%c per ton, which was the same rate as the royalty 
on an adjacent Federal mining lease held by the plaintiffs, and 
Mr. Blake further stated that the rate was subject to 
readjustment at the end of its 20 year term in 1983. 
The plaintiffs proceeded to mine coal under the 
Stare Lease beginning in the third quarter of 1981 and 
continuing through June of 1983. The plaintiffs again 
commenced mining on the property in February of 1985 and has 
continued to the present. 
The royalty reporting form was provided by the Utah 
Board of State Lands and under the title Royalty Data it has 
two columns. One is headed c/T Basis, and the other is headed 
Percentage Basis. Plaintiffs filled in the column entitled c/T 
Basis and paid the amount of royalty shown to be due under that 
column at 17^c per ton and left the other column blank. 
During the period of mining, the plaintiffs reported 
and paid the royalty to the State at the rate of 17^c per ton 
on the form provided without objection or comment by the 
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defendants. In October of 1985, the plaintiffs made a demand 
upon the plaintiffs for delinquent royalty, interest and 
penalties in the sum of $197,193.09 contending that the royalty 
payments should have been 8% of value of coal mined during the 
audit period based upon the Federal Lease Amendments Act and 
regulations promulgated thereunder, and the Federal Leases 
which have been issued in the State of Utah since 1979. 
Based upon an examination of the Lease and the 
parties attempts to comply with its terms, and particularly the 
expressed attitude of the various individuals whose 
responsibility it was to enforce the Lease for and on behalf of 
the State, the Court finds that as a matter of law the royalty 
provision as contained in Article III, paragraph Second (b) of 
the lease is ambiguous. 
Subparagraph (b) leaves the amount due based on 
several factors not immediately capable of definitive 
determination. The ambiguity arises as much from what is not 
stated and provided as from what is stated. In other words, at 
the beginning of the reporting quarter what is the prevailing 
federal rate and who makes that determination, the lessor or 
the lessee, and what factors are to be included in making a 
determination as what federal rate prevails and in what area is 
it prevalent? Who makes the determination that the land in the 
State Lease and the land in the Federal Lease are similar in 
-5-
character and what is the basis for determining similarity? 
What time period is used to determine federal leases "issued... 
at that time" and who makes that determination? Even if a 
prevailing federal rate is established, does it apply to the 
"value of the coal removed" as stated in the federal regulation 
or to the "gross sales value" as used by the State auditor in 
his assessment, and who makes that determination? 
For these reasons, the Court has concluded that 
sub-paragraph (b) is not self-executing as to create a legal 
obligation on the lessee since r.he identifiable factors 
necessary for self-execution coi.ld not independently be 
ascertained by either party. 
Sub-paragraph (b) was written by the State for its 
benefit and since it is not self-executing, it would require 
some affirmitive action on their part to bring the provision of 
that sub-paragraph into an enforceable position other than a 
retroactive audit after having accepted 17%c per ton from the 
beginning of mining until the last of 1985, without objection 
or comment. 
Under these circumstances, the Court must look to 
the prior conduct of the lessor and the lessees under the Lease 
over a period of years that show that they chose to ingnore the 
provisions of sub-paragraph (b), and to calculate the royalty 
at the rate of 17^c per ton. 
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Since the State by an established course of conduct 
for many years adopted a construction of the Lease that 
provided for 17^c a ton, they are now precluded from asserting 
a different construction of the Lease where they took no 
sufficient or positive action to establish their now asserted 
construction to an ambiguous lease provision. 
Because of the above legal conclusion, it would not 
be necessary for the Court to go further, but as a further 
ground for what the Courtfs final conclusion and ruling will 
be, the Court will address other issues presented. 
The Court is of the opinion that regardless of 
whether the status of the land is School Trust Land or not, the 
State acts in its proprietary capacity when it enters into a 
contractual lease that is authorized under law and that the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the State 
and its Land Board as any other contracting individual. 
The Court has concluded as a matter of law that the 
State is estopped from demanding payment of royalty based upon 
the 8% of value figure. The undisputed facts show that the 
State was aware of the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of 
Article III of their own Lease and were made aware by the 
quarterly payments submitted by plaintiffs that those 
provisions were being ignored by leaving that reporting column 
blank and by accepting, throughout the auditing period, without 
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question or objection, royalty based upon like a ton. If the 
provisions of sub-paragraph (b) were going to be implemented, 
the State had a duty to speak which they did not do. By their 
conduct and failure to perform this duty, they induced 
plaintiffs to believe that 11h$ a ton was the acceptable 
royalty and plaintiffs, in reliance thereon, continued to mine 
coal under the Lease which they would not have done had they 
known that the defendants were going to insist upon the 8% of 
value provision. The great injustice that would result to 
plaintiffs if we now allow the defendants to assert this 
position, is quite obvious since the record shows that to allow 
the imposition of u,he greater royalty, the plaintiffs would 
show a substantial loss on all mining activity under the State 
Lease. 
Even if the conclusion is reached that the defendants 
were acting in a governmental capacity, they would still be 
estopped from asserting the new royalty rate. No substantial 
adverse effect on public policy will result if the defendants 
are estopped from applying this newly determined royalty 
retroactively. The State can still proceed to lease coal lands 
on any terms it feels profitable and that will give the State 
the maximum return. They still have the power to revise the 
wording of their coal leases to do away with any ambiguity and 
to carry out any legally established policy. 
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The Court further finds that the State had no right 
under the Lease to impose interest, except on delinquent 
payments at the legal rate, or any penalty. A legally binding 
lease cannot be altered or added to by by rules and regulations 
adopted subsequently. 
The Lease does state that it is subject to such 
operating rules and regulations as nay be hereafter approved 
and adopted. Such a provision could not be interpreted to mean 
changes to or additions of monetary payment. "Operating Rules" 
has reference to method of mining and can have no other logical 
interpretation. Since the amount claimed by the State is not 
subject to definitive determination, any interest that may be 
due could not commence to run until demand is made. 
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants 
plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as prayed for 
and denies defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to 
prepare a formal order in accordance with this opinion. 
DATED this ^>T^- day of February, 1988. 
^ ^ ^ ^ O Y D ^ J S N N E L L , D^S^rict Judge" / 
KEITH E. TAYLOR (A3201) 
PATRICIA J. WINMILL (A3523) 
LUCY B. JENKINS (A2973) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utan 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY; 




THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH 
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE 
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND 
FORESTRY; THE UTAH BOARD OF 
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; THE 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES; DEE HANSEN, EXECUTIVE 
DIRECTOR THE UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * 
This cause came on for hearing on cross motions for 
summary judgment on February 16, 1988. It appearing to the Court 
that plaintiffs are entitled to Declaratory Judgment as a matter 
of law on the uncontroverted material facts of record, the Court 
having heretofore entered its Memorandum Decision on Motions for 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 4779 
Summary Judgment on February 24, 1988, and good and sufficient 
cause appearing therefore, 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. Defendants are not entitled to recover from plain-
tiffs royalty payments of more than 17-1/2 cents per ton or 
interest relating to tons of coal reported by plaintiffs for 
which royalty payments were made at 17-1/2 cents per ton under 
the provisions of State Lease No, 25005 prior to the readjustment 
of the terms thereof at the end of its 20 year term in January of 
1988. 
2. This Summary Judgment reserves, and does not 
resolve, any remaining disoute between the parties regarding the 
amount of coal mined in State Lease No. 25005 by plaintiffs. 
3. The parties hereto shall bear their own respective 
costs and attorneys1 fees. 
DONE IN OPEN COUR^ this ^ ? da,y of March, 1988. 
- * > -
Proof read: VS CP 
4 » r-
MINERAL LEASE NO. C ^ 
APPLICATION NO. 25J03 GRANT: School 120.00 acres 
Wornal School 40.00 •' 
UTAH STATE LEASE FOR 
COAL 
THIS INDENTURE OF LEASE AND AGREEMENT entered into in duplicate this ?->rrj 
day of ^nn.ry , 19 ^P, by and between the STATE UND BOARD, acting in 
behalf of the State of Utah, hereinafter called the Lessor, and 
TiiE REHIRE* COAL COMPANY 
Frontier, UyoHng 
party of the aecond part, hereinafter called the Lessee, under and Puriuant to Title 65, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
WITNESSETH: 
That the Lessor, in consideration of the rents and royalties to be paid and the cov-
enants to be observed the Lessee, as hereinafter set forth, does hereby grant and lease to 
the Lessee the exclusive right and privilege to mine, remove, and dispose of all of the 
said minerals in, upon, or under the following described tract of land situated in 
Ercry County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
Northwest Quarter (WWk) of Northeast Quarccr (N?i) of Section Twenty (20j . 
South Half (Si) of Southwest Quarter (SV-i) of Section Twenty-nine (jjj» 
Southeast Quarter (SEV) of Southeast Quarter (SZ^) of Section Thirty (30), Township 
Twenty-two (22) South, Range Six (6) East, Salt La^e Keridian, " 
containing a total of 160.00 acres, more or less, together with the right to use 
and occupy so much of the surface of said land as may be required for all pruposes reason-
ably incident to the mining, removal, and disposal of said minerals, according to the 
provisions of this lease, for the period ending ten years after the first day of the month 
next succeeding the date hereof and as long thereafter as said minerals may be produced in 
coamercial quantities from said lands, or Lessee shall continue to make the payments required 
by Article III hereof, upon condition that at the end of each twenty (20) year period 
succeeding the first day of the year in which this lease is issued, such readjustment of 
terms and conditions may be made as the Lessor may determine to be necessary in the interest 
of the State. 
ARTICLE I 
This lease is granted subject in all respects to and under the conditions of the laws 
of the State of Utah and existing rules and regulations and such operating rules and 
regulations as may be hereafter approved and adopted by the State Land Board. 
ARTICLE II 
This lease covers only the mining, removal, and disposal of the minerals specified m 
this lease, but the Lessee shall promptly notify the Lessor of the discovery of any minerals 
excepting those enumerated herein. 
ARTICLE 111 
The Lessee, in consideration of the granting of the rights and privileges aforesaid, 
hereby covenants and ;agrees as follows: 
FIRST: To pay to the Lessor as rental for the land covered by this lease the sum of 
fifty (50) cents per acre per annum. All such annual payments of rental shall be made in 
advance on the first day of the month following the anniversary date of each year, except 
the first year rental which is payable on application for this lease. All rentals shall be 
credited against royalties for the year in which they accrue. 
SECOND: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day of the month succeeding 
each quarter, royalty 
(a) at the rate of 15c per ton of 2000 lbs. of coal produced from the leased 
premises and sold or otherwise disposed of, or 
Pige No. 2 
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of the quarter for which payment 
is being made, for federal le^eas of land of similar character under 
coal leases issued by the United Sta:es at that time, 
whichever is higher, and, commencing with the year beginning the January 1, following two 
years from the date hereof, to pay annual royalty of at least $1.00 multiplied by the 
number of acres hereby leased regardless of actual production, provided that Lesser may, 
at any time after the tenth anniversary date hereof, increase the minimum annual royalty by 
not to exceed 507.. 
If the coal produced from the leased premises is washed before sale or other disposi-
tion by Lessee, Lessee may pay royalty on the washed product only, provided Lessee maintain 
accurate record by which the weight of washed coal originating from the leased premises can 
be ascertained and complies with all regulations and directives issued by Lessor to prevent 
waste and to insure that royalty is paid on all washed coal originating from the leased 
premises. 
THIRD: To prepare and forward to the State Land Office, on or before the 15th day of 
the month next succeeding the quarter in which the material is produced, a certified state-
ment of the amount of production of all of the leased substances disposed of fror. said land 
and such other additional information as the State Land Board may from time to time require 
FOURTH: To keep at the mine office clear, accurate and detailed maps on tracing cloth 
on a scale not more than 50 feet to the inch, of the workings in each section of the leased 
lands and on the lands adjacent, said maps tc be coordinated with reference to a public lam 
corner so that they can be readily and correctly superimposed, and to furnish to the Lessor 
annually, or upon demand, certified copies of such maps and such written statements of 
operations as may be called for. All surveys shall be made by a licensed engineer arvi all 
maps certified to by him. 
FIFTH: Not to fence or otherwise- ma'<e inaccessible to stock any watering place on 
the precises without first obtaining the written consent of Lessor, nor to permi' or con-
tribute to the pollution of any surface of subsurface water available or capable of being 
made available for domestic or irrigation
 vs«-. 
SIXTH: Not to assign this lease or any interest therein, nor sublet anv pert ion of 
the leased premises, or any oi the rights aT,d privileges herein granted, withejt the 
written consent of the Lessor being first had and obtained. 
ARTICLE IV 
The Lessor hereby excepts and reserves from the operation of this lease: 
FIRST: The right to permit for joint o: several use such easenents or rights-of-way 
upon, through, or in the land hereby leased as may be necessary or appropriate tc the 
working of these or other lands belonging tc or administered by the Lessor containing 
mineral deposits or for other use. 
SECOND: The right to use, lease, sill, or otherwise dispose of the surface of said 
lands or any part thereof, under existing State laws or laws hereafter enacted, insofar as 
said surface is not necessary for the Lessee in the mining, removal, or disposal of the 
leased substances therein, and to lease mineral deposits, other than those leased hereby, 
which say be contained in said lands so long as the recovery of such deposits does not un-
reasonably interfere with Lessee's rights herein granted. 
ARTICLE V 
Upon failure or refusal of the Lessee to accept the readjustment of terms and condition 
demanded by the Lessor at the end of any twenty-year period, puch failure or refusal snail 
work a forfeiture of the lease and the same shall be cancelled. 
ARTICLE VI 
In case of expiration, forfeiture, surrender or other termination of this lease, all 
underground timbering supports, shaft linings, rails, and other installations necessary for 
the support of underground workings of any mines, and all rails or head frames and all insta 
ations which cannot be removed without permanent injury to the premises and all construction 
and equipment installed underground to provide ventilation for any mines, upon or in the sai 
lands shall be and remain a part of the realty and shall revert* to the Lessor without fur the 
consideration or compensation and shall be left by the Lessee in the lands. 
Pige No. 3 
All personal property of Lessee located within or upon the said lands, and all build-
ings, machinery, equipment and tools (other than the installations to become the property 
of Lessor as above provided), shall be and remain the property of Lessee and Lessee shall 
be entitled to, and may, within six (6) months after such expiration, forfeiture, surrender 
or other termination of said lease, or within such extension of time as may be granted by 
Lessor, remove from the said lands such personal property and improvements, other than 
those items which are to remain the property of the Lessor as above provided. 
Lessee shall, upon termination, of this lease or abandonment of the leased premise 
for any reason, seal to Lessor's satisfaction all or such part of the mine openings on the 
premises as Lessor shall request be sealed. 
ARTICLE VII 
It shall be the responsibility of the Lessee to slope the sides of all operations of 
a surface nature to an angle of not less than 45° or to erect a barrier around such opera-
tion MB the State Land Board may require Such sloping or fencing shall become a normal 
part of the operation of the lease so a« to Keep pace with such operation to the extent 
that such operation shall not constitute a hazard. 
ARTICLE VIII 
Lessee shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any water rights acquired for u^e upon 
the leased premises except with Lessor's written permission Upon termination of this lease 
for anv reason, all such rights acquired by application to the Utah State Engineer shall 
revert to the Lessor as an appurtenance to the leased premises, and all such n g ^ s acquired 
by other means shall be offered to Lessor in writing for pjrehase at Lessee's acouisition 
costs, provided that Lessor shall be deeded to have rejected such offer if it does not accept 
the same within thirty davs after receipt thereof. 
ARTICLE IX 
All of the terms, covenants, condition^ and obligations in this lease contained, shall 
be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of the Lessee 
ARTICLE X 
Lessee ma\ s u r r e n d e r t h i s l e a s e for c a n c e l l a t i o n b ,^ Lessor as to a l l or a^v p a r t of 
the l eased l a n d s , but n o t l e s s than a q u a r t e r - q u a r t e r s e c t i o n or surveyed l o t , upon pavraent 
of a l l r e n t a l s , r o y a l t i e s and o t h e r amounts due Lesser anc by f i l i n g wi th the Lessor a 
w r i t t e n r e l i n q u i s h m e n t . The r e l i n q u i s h m e n t s h a l l be e f f e c t i v e as to f u tu r e r e n t a l l i a b i l -
i t y on the d a t e of filing such r e l i n q u i s h m e n t , but o t h e r w i s e on the d a t e of c a n c e l l a t i o n by 
L e s s o r . 
ARTICLE XI 
Lessor, its officers and agents, shall ha*e the right at all times to go in and upon 
the leased lands and premises, during the term of said lease to inspect the work done and 
the progress thereof on said lands and the products obtained therefrom, and to post any 
notices on the said lands that it may deem fit and proper, and also shall permit any 
authorized representatives of the Lessor to examine all books and records pertaining to 
operations under this lease, and to make copies of and extracts from the same, if desired 
ARTICLE XII 
This lease is issued only under such title as the State of Utah may now hold, and that 
in the vent the State is hereafter divested of such title, the Lessor shall not be liable 
for any damages sustained by the Lessee, nor shall the Lessee be entitled to or clair any 
refund of rentals or ro>alties or other monies theretofore paid to the Lessor 
ARTICLE XIII 
If the Lessee shall initiate or establish any water right on the lease premises, such 
right, shall become an appurtenance of the leased premises, and, upon the termination of 
the lease, the Lessee shall convey the right to the Lessor. 
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ARTICLE XIV 
Said lease and this agreement are made upon the condition that Lessee shall perform 
•11 the covenants and agreements herein set forth to be performed by it, and if at any time 
there shall be any default on the part of Lessee hereunder, and if such default shall con-
tinue for a period of thirty (30) days after written notice of such default being given by 
Lessor to Lessee, then and in such event said lease and this agreement shall, at the option 
of Lessor, be terminated by written notice to Lessee and the demised premises shall revert 
to Lessor. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto subscribed their names the day and year 
first above written. 
Attest: 
- — j 
Lessee 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
On the day of , 1967, personally appeared before me 
^^_____ , the signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me thai , executed the same. 
Given under my hand and seal this day of , 19 . 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public, residing at: 
WYOMING 
STATE OF jtfASc ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF LINCOLN ) 
On the day of March
 t 19 68f personally appeared be fere ne 
G. E, SORENSEN who being duly swern did say that he is an officer cf 
TH£ KJLMHLKJLK I U A L luWPSNY and that said instrument wa; signed in 
behalf of said corporation by resolution of its Board of Direstors, and said 
C. E. SORENSEN acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the sane. 
Given under my hand and seal this day of , 19 . 
My commission expires: 
Notary Public, residing a:: 
Frontier, Wyoming 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ^ ^ 
On the day of *•*•' - ' li"*-> , 19 , personally appeared before r_e, 
Charles R. Hansen, who being by me duly sworn did say that he is the Director of the Scate 
Land Board of the State of Utah and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said 5oard, 
and said Charles R. Hansen acknowledged to me that said Board executed the sare in behalf of 
the State of Utah. 
Given under my hand and seal this 
My commission expires: 
APR 1 0 i3b3 
Secretary 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE LAND BOARD 
BY ( ^ r . / 6 - V X 7 r ~ ~ ^ > -
Director ^ Lessor 
THE K£34KgRg£ COAL COMPANY 
Presicent 
day of 19 
s «£•- / 
Notary Public, residing at; 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
STATE OF WYOMING ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF LINCOLN ) 
On the// -^  day of March, 1968, personally appeared 
before me G. E. SORENSEN, who, being by me duly sworn, did say, 
that he is the President of THE KEMMERER COAL COMPANY, and that 
said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by 
authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors, and said 
G. E. SORENSEN duly acknowledged to me that said corporation 
executed the same and that the seal affixed is the seal of said 
corporation. 




^ J^/U J<r t. 
Notary Public " TT 
Residing at: Frontier, Wyoming 
My Commission Expires: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to Keith E. Taylor, PARSONS, 
BEHLE & LATIMER, 185 South State Street} Suite 700, P.O. Box 
11898, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 on tni/s /(pday of September, 
1988. 
Clartt B^/Allred" 3^ r 
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